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(71) Applicant (for all designated States except US): HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY [US/US]; 3000 Hanover Street, Palo Alto, CA 94304 (US).			
(72) Inventors; and			
(75) Inventors/Applicants (for US only): BALACHEFF, Boris [FR/GB]; 215 High Kingsdown, St. Michael's Hill, Bristol BS2 8DG (GB). CHAN, David [GB/US]; 16112 Mays Avenue, Monte Sereno, CA 95030 (US).			
(74) Agent: LAWRENCE, Richard, Anthony; Hewlett-Packard Limited, Intellectual Property Section, Filton Road, Stoke Gifford, Bristol BS34 8QZ (GB).			
(54) Title: SMARTCARD USER INTERFACE FOR TRUSTED COMPUTING PLATFORM			
(57) Abstract			
There is disclosed a trusted computer entity which can be used as a stand-alone device, or as a node in a network of connected computing entities, e.g. as an internet port, the computing entity having a trusted monitoring component which monitors operation of a computer platform, wherein a user is provided with a smart card trusted token by means of which the user can establish confidence in the computer platform by means of the smart card communicating with the trusted component and the trusted component verifying to the smart card that the computer platform is operating correctly. Once it has received such verification, the smart card is adapted to undertake specific actions of which it is capable. A user may be issued with a plurality of smart cards, and the smart cards may be capable of verifying a level of trust of any one of a plurality of computing entities equipped with a trusted component.			
<pre> graph TD A[Application waiting for Smartcard authorisation to proceed with operation] --> B[User inserts Smartcard into Smartcard reader on computing entity] B --> C[Application or operating system of computing entity requests data from Smartcard] C --> D[Smartcard requests delay in supplying requested data and requests computer entity to allow access to trusted component] D --> E[Smartcard checks integrity of computing entity by means of integrity challenge mechanism] E --> F[If integrity checks are satisfied, Smartcard proceeds to respond to request for data from application] </pre>			

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SMARTCARD USER INTERFACE FOR TRUSTED COMPUTING PLATFORM

Field of the Invention

5 The present invention relates to the field of computers, and particularly, although not exclusively, to a computing entity which can be placed into a trusted state, and a method of operating the computing entity such that a user of the entity is confident that the computing entity is in the trusted state.

10 **Background to the Invention**

Conventional prior art mass market computing platforms include the well-known personal computer (PC) and competing products such as the Apple Macintosh™, and a proliferation of known palm-top and laptop personal computers. Generally, markets for such machines fall into two categories, these being domestic or consumer, and 15 corporate. A general requirement for a computing platform for domestic or consumer use is a relatively high processing power, Internet access features, and multi-media features for handling computer games. For this type of computing platform, the Microsoft Windows® '95 and '98 operating system products and Intel processors dominate the market.

20 On the other hand, for business use in many applications, a server platform provides centralized data storage, and application functionality for a plurality of client stations. For business use, key criteria are reliability, networking features, and security features. For such platforms, the Microsoft Windows NT 4.0™ operating system is common, as well as the Unix™ operating system.

25 With the increase in commercial activity transacted over the Internet, known as "e-commerce", there has been much interest in the prior art in enabling data transactions between computing platforms over the Internet of both domestic and commercial types. A fundamental issue in acceptance of such systems is the one of trust between interacting computer platforms for the making of such transactions.

30 There have been several prior art schemes which are aimed at increasing the security and trustworthiness of computer platforms. Predominantly, these rely upon adding in security features at the application level, that is to say the security features are not inherently embedded in the kernel of operating systems, and are not built in to the fundamental hardware components of the computing platform. Portable 35 computer devices have already appeared on the market which include a smartcard, which contains data specific to a user, which is input into a smartcard reader on the

computer. Presently, such smartcards are at the level of being add-on extras to conventional personal computers, and in some cases are integrated into a casing of a known computer. Although these prior art schemes go some way to improving the security of computer platforms, the levels of security and trustworthiness gained by prior art schemes may be considered insufficient to enable widespread application of automated transactions between computer platforms. For businesses to expose significant value transactions to electronic commerce on a widespread scale, they require confidence in the trustworthiness of the underlying technology.

Prior art computing platforms have several problems which stand in the way of increasing their inherent security:

- The operating status of a computer platform and the status of the data within the platform is dynamic and difficult to predict. It is difficult to determine whether a computer platform is operating correctly because the state of the computer platform and data on the platform is constantly changing and the computer platform itself may be dynamically changing.
- From a security point of view, commercial computer platforms, in particular client platforms, are often deployed in environments which are vulnerable to unauthorized modification. The main areas of vulnerability include modification by software loaded by a user, or via a network connection. Particularly, but not exclusively, conventional computer platforms may be vulnerable to attack by virus programs, with varying degrees of hostility.
- Computer platforms may be upgraded or their capabilities may be extended or restricted by physical modification, i.e. addition or deletion of components such as hard disk drives, peripheral drivers and the like.

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It is known to provide security features for computer systems, which are embedded in operating software. These security features are primarily aimed at providing division of information within a community of users of a local system. In the known Microsoft Windows NT™ 4.0 operating system, there exists a monitoring facility called a "system log event viewer" in which a log of events occurring within the platform is recorded into an event log data file which can be inspected by a system administrator using the windows NT operating system software. This facility goes some way to enabling a system administrator to security monitor pre-selected events. The event logging function in the Windows NT™ 4.0 operating system provides system monitoring.

In terms of overall security of a computer platform, a purely software based system is vulnerable to attack, for example by viruses of which there are thousands of different varieties. Several proprietary virus finding and correcting applications are known, for example the Dr Solomons™ virus toolkit program or Norton™ anti-virus 5 kit. The Microsoft Windows NT™ 4.0 software includes a virus guard software, which is preset to look for known viruses. However, virus strains are developing continuously, and the virus guard software will not give reliable protection against newer unknown viruses. New strains of virus are being developed and released into the computing and internet environment on an ongoing basis.

10 Prior art monitoring systems for computer entities focus on network monitoring functions, where an administrator uses network management software to monitor performance of a plurality of networked computers. In these known systems, trust in the system does not reside at the level of individual trust of each hardware unit of each computer platform in a system, but relies on a network administrator monitoring 15 each computer in the network. Prior art systems cannot verify operation of remote computers running different operating systems on different networks, for example as accessed over the internet.

In known systems there is difficulty in establishing trust between a user of a computing platform and the computing platform.

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Summary of the Invention

One object of the present invention is to provide a computing entity in which a user can have a high degree of confidence that the computing entity has not been corrupted by an external influence, and is operating in a predictable and known 25 manner.

Another object of the present invention is to simplify a task of a user of a computing entity judging whether the trustworthiness of the computing entity is sufficient to perform a particular task or set of tasks or type of task required by the user.

30 In the specific embodiments, the user is provided with a trusted token device which is portable and separable from a computer entity. The token device is trusted by the user to verify that a computer entity which the user wishes to use is trustworthy. In the general case, the token device is not restricted to verifying the trustworthiness of one particular computer entity, but is generic to operate with any 35 one or more of a plurality of computer entities.

According to first aspect of the present invention there is provided a system of computing apparatus comprising: a computing platform having a first data processor and a first data storage means; a monitoring component having a second data processor and a second data storage means, wherein said monitoring component is

5 configured to perform a plurality of data checks on said computing platform; and a token device being physically distinct and separable from said computing platform and said monitoring component, wherein in one mode of operation, said token device operates to make an integrity challenge to said monitoring component and said token device will not undertake specific actions of which it is capable unless it receives a

10 satisfactory response to said integrity challenge.

Said token device may receive a detailed response to said integrity challenge, and process said integrity response to interpret said integrity response.

The system may further comprise a third party server, wherein a response to said integrity challenge is sent to said third party server. Said monitoring component

15 may send a detailed integrity response to said third party server if requested in the integrity challenge by said token device. Said monitoring component may report a detailed integrity response to said token device, and said token device may send said integrity response to said third party server, if it requires the third party server to help interpret said detailed integrity response. Said third party server may simplify said

20 integrity response to a form in which said token device can interpret said integrity response. Said third party server may send said simplified integrity response to said token device. The system may further operate the steps of adding a digital signature data to said simplified integrity response, said digital signature data authenticating said third party server to said token device.

25 Said token device may be requested to take an action. Alternatively, said token device may request to take an action.

In one mode of operation, the token device may send image data to said computer platform if a said satisfactory response to said integrity challenge is received, and said computer platform may display said image data.

30 Preferably said monitoring component is capable of establishing an identity of itself. Preferably the system further comprises an interface means for interfacing between said monitoring component and said token device. Preferably said computing entity is configured such that said monitoring component reports said data checks to said token device, said data checks containing data describing a status of said computer platform.

A said specific action may comprise authorising said computing platform to undertake a transaction on behalf of a user of said system.

According to a second aspect of the present invention there is provided a system of computing apparatus comprising: a computing platform having a first data processor and a first data storage means; a monitoring component having a second data processor and a second data storage means, wherein said monitoring component is configured to perform a plurality of data checks on said computing platform; and a token device being physically distinct and separable from said computing platform and said monitoring component, wherein said token device sends an integrity challenge to said monitoring component; said monitoring component generates a response to said integrity challenge; if said token device receives a satisfactory response to said integrity challenge, then said token device sends verification data to said computer platform, said verification data verifying correct operation of said computer platform; and said computer platform displays said verification data on a visual display screen.

According to a third aspect of the present invention there is provided a computing entity comprising: a computing platform having a first data processor and first data storage means; a monitoring component having a second data processor and second data storage means, wherein said monitoring component is configured to perform a plurality of data checks on said computing platform, said monitoring component being capable of establishing an identity of itself; interface means for communicating with a token device, said interface means communicating with said monitoring component, wherein said computing entity is configured such that said monitoring component reports said data checks to said token device, said data checks containing data describing a status of said computer platform.

Preferably on communication between said token device and said interface means, said monitoring component is activated to perform a monitoring operation on said computer platform, in which said monitoring component obtains data describing an operating status of said computer platform.

Said interface means is resident substantially wholly within said monitoring component in a preferred implementation. In an alternative implementation, said interface means may comprise said computer platform. Said interface means preferably comprises a PCSC stack in accordance with PCSC Workgroup PC/SC Specification 1.0.

Said monitoring component may comprise a verification means configured to obtain a certification data independently certifying said status data, and to provide said certification data to said interface means. Said interface means may be configured to send and receive data according to a pro-active protocol.

5 According to a fourth aspect of the present invention there is provided a method of obtaining verification of a state of a computer entity, said computer entity comprising a computer platform comprising a first data processor and a first memory means, and a monitoring component comprising a second data processor and a second memory means, said method comprising the steps of: receiving an
10 interrogation request signal via an interface of said computing entity; said monitoring component performing a monitoring operation of said computer platform in response to a said received interrogation request signal; and said monitoring component reporting a result message to said interface, said result message describing a result of said monitoring operation.

15 Said monitoring operation may comprise the steps of: said monitoring component carrying out one or a plurality of data checks on components of said computing platform; said monitoring component being able to report a set of certified reference data together with said data checks.

20 Said certified reference data may include a set of metrics to be expected when measuring particular components of said computing platform, and may include digital signature data identifying an entity that certifies said reference data.

25 Preferably said step of reporting verification of said monitoring operation comprises sending a confirmation signal to a token device said confirmation signal describing a result of said monitoring operation. Preferably said result message is transmitted by said interface to a token device external of said computing entity.

A result of said monitoring operation may be reported by generating a visual display of confirmation data.

30 The method may further comprise the steps of: adding a digital signature data to said result message, said digital signature data identifying said monitoring component; transmitting said result message and said digital signature data from said interface.

35 According to a fifth aspect of the present invention there is provided a method of obtaining verification of a state of a computer entity, said computer entity comprising a computer platform and a monitoring component, said method comprising the steps of: an application requesting access to a functionality from a said token device; in response to said request for access to functionality, said token

device generating a request signal requesting a verification data from said monitoring component; in response to said request for verification, said monitoring component reports a result message to said token device, said result message describing a result of a monitoring operation; by receipt of a satisfactory said result message, said 5 token device offers said functionality to said application.

The method may further comprise a response to said integrity challenge being sent to said third party server. Said monitoring component may send a detailed integrity response to said third party server if requested in the integrity challenge by said token device. The said monitoring component may report a detailed integrity 10 response to said token device, and said token device may send said integrity response to said third party server, if it requires the third party server to help interpret said detailed integrity response. Said third party server may simplify said integrity response to a form in which said token device can interpret said integrity response. Said third party server may send said simplified integrity response to said token 15 device.

The method may further operate the step of adding a digital signature data to said simplified integrity response, said digital signature data authenticating said third party server to said token device.

Said token device may be requested to take an action. Alternatively, said token 20 device may request to take an action.

According to a sixth aspect of the present invention there is provided a method of checking an integrity of operation of a computing entity, said computing entity comprising a computer platform having a first processor means and first data storage means, and a monitoring component comprising a second processor and second 25 memory means, by means of a token device, said token device comprising a third data processor and a third memory means, said method comprising the steps of: programming said token device to respond to a received poll signal from an application program, said poll signal received from said computer platform; said token device receiving a poll signal from said computer platform; in response to said 30 received poll signal, said token device generating a signal for requesting a verification operation by said monitoring component; and said monitoring component performing a verification operation of said computer platform in response to said received signal from said token device.

According to a seventh aspect of the present invention there is provided a 35 token device for verifying a status of a computing entity, said token device comprising: a data storage device; and means for communicating with a computing

entity; wherein said data storage device is configured to store a status request message for requesting a status data from said computing entity.

5 Said token device may further comprise a data processor. Said token device may be configured to be responsive to a poll signal operating in accordance with PC/SC specification 1.0. Said token device may be capable of initiating a command to be handled by a software stack on the computer entity in response to said poll signal according to a proactive protocol.

10 According to an eighth aspect of the present invention there is provided a method of verifying a status of a computing entity, by means of a token device provided external of said computing entity, said method comprising the steps of: said token device receiving a poll signal; said token device responding to said poll signal by providing a request for obtaining verification of a state of said computer entity; and said token device receiving a result message, said result message describing the result of said verification.

15 The method may further comprise sending a response to said integrity challenge to said third party server. Said monitoring component may send a detailed integrity response to said third party server if requested in the integrity challenge by said token device. Said monitoring component may report a detailed integrity response to said token device, and said token device may send said integrity 20 response to said third party server, if it requires the third party server to help interpret said detailed integrity response. Said third party server may simplify said integrity response to a form in which said token device can interpret said integrity response. Said third party server may send said simplified integrity response to said token device.

25 The system may further operate the step of adding a digital signature data to said simplified integrity response, said digital signature data authenticating said third party server to said token device.

Said token device may be requested to take an action. Alternatively, said token device may request to take an action.

30 The invention includes a method by which a token device can obtain verification of a state of a computing platform by using a monitoring component, said monitoring component being capable of performing at least one data check on said computer platform, and establishing an identity of itself, and establishing a report of said at least one data check; and wherein said token device has data processing 35 capability and behaves in an expected manner; said token device being physically separable from said computing platform and said monitoring component, said token

device having cryptographic data processing capability wherein, said monitoring component proves its identity to said token device and establishes a report to said token device of at least one data check performed on said computing platform.

The invention includes a token device comprising a data processor and a memory device, said token device configured to perform at least one data processing or signaling function, wherein said token device operates to: receive an integrity check data from an external source; if said integrity check data supplied to said token device is satisfactory, then said token device allows a said function; and if said integrity check data received by said token device is unsatisfactory, then said token device denies said function.

Brief Description of the Drawings

For a better understanding of the invention and to show how the same may be carried into effect, there will now be described by way of example only, specific 15 embodiments, methods and processes according to the present invention with reference to the accompanying drawings in which:

Figure 1 is a diagram that illustrates a system capable of implementing embodiments of the present invention;

Figure 2 is a diagram which illustrates a motherboard including a trusted 20 device arranged to communicate with a smart card via a smart card reader and with a group of modules;

Figure 3 is a diagram that illustrates the trusted device in more detail;

Figure 4 is a flow diagram which illustrates the steps involved in acquiring an 25 integrity metric of the computing apparatus;

Figure 5 is a flow diagram which illustrates the steps involved in establishing communications between a trusted computing platform and a remote platform including the trusted platform verifying its integrity;

Figure 6 is a diagram that illustrates the operational parts of a user smart card for use in accordance with embodiments of the present invention;

Figure 7 is a flow diagram which illustrates the process of mutually 30 authenticating a smart card and a host platform;

Fig. 8 illustrates schematically a set of process steps carried out by a smart card and computing entity according to a first use model;

Fig. 9 illustrates schematically a second mode of operation of the computing 35 entity and smart card in which an application requests authorization from the smart card;

Fig. 10 illustrates schematically communication between the smart card and an interface module comprising the computing entity;

Fig. 11 illustrates schematically a computing system comprising a computing entity, a token device, and a remote trusted server, in which the token device delegates computation of encrypted integrity metrics to the trusted server in order to verify information received from a trusted component within a computing entity;

Fig. 12 illustrates schematically a mode of operation of the system of Fig. 11 in which integrity metric data is sent from a trusted component to a token device and the token device then sends the data to a trusted server for data processing according to a third mode of operation;

Fig. 13 illustrates schematically a further specific embodiment implementation of a system according to the present invention in which conventional PCSC technology is used to communicate with a smartcard, and in which the smartcard is able to give authorization for a transaction to a prior art application program, which operates through a subsystem interface to a trusted component; and

Fig. 14 illustrates schematically operation of the embodiment shown in Fig. 15 enabling a smartcard to allow authorization for a transaction after having received confirmation of a trustworthy state of a computer entity with which it is co-operating.

20 **Detailed Description of the Best Mode for Carrying Out the Invention**

There will now be described by way of example a best mode contemplated by the inventors for carrying out the invention, together with alternative embodiments. In the following description numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the present invention. It will be apparent however, to one skilled in the art, that the present invention may be practiced without limitation to these specific details. In other instances, well known methods and structures have not been described in detail so as not to unnecessarily obscure the present invention.

30 Specific implementations of the present invention comprise a computer platform having a processing means and a memory means, and a monitoring component which is physically associated with the computer platform, and known herein after as a "trusted component" (or "trusted device") which monitors operation of the computer platform by collecting metrics data from the computer platform, and which is capable of verifying to other entities interacting with the computer platform, the correct functioning of the computer platform. A token device which may be 35 personal to a human user of computer platform interacts with a trusted component

associated with the computer platform to verify to the human user the trustworthiness of the computer platform.

A user of a computing entity established a level of trust with the computer entity by use of such a trusted token device. The trusted token device is a personal and portable device having a data processing capability and in which the user has a high level of confidence. The trusted token device may perform the functions of:

- 5 • verifying a correct operation of a computing platform in a manner which is readily apparent to the user, for example by audio or visual display;
- 10 • challenging a monitoring component to provide evidence of a correct operation of a computer platform with which the monitoring component is associated; and
- 15 • establishing a level of interaction of the token device with a computing platform, depending on whether a monitoring component has provided satisfactory evidence of a correct operation of the computing entity, and withholding specific interactions with the computer entity if such evidence of correct operation is not received by the token device.

The token device may be requested to take an action, for example by an application resident on the computing platform, or by remote application, or alternatively the token device may initiate an action itself.

20 In this specification, the term "trusted" when used in relation to a physical or logical component, is used to mean that the physical or logical component always behaves in an expected manner. The behavior of that component is predictable and known. Trusted components have a high degree of resistance to unauthorized modification.

25 In this specification, the term 'computer entity' is used to describe a computer platform and a monitoring component.

In this specification, the term "computer platform" is used to refer to at least one data processor and at least one data storage means, usually but not essentially with associated communications facilities e.g. a plurality of drivers, associated 30 applications and data files, and which may be capable of interacting with external entities e.g. a user or another computer platform, for example by means of connection to the internet, connection to an external network, or by having an input port capable of receiving data stored on a data storage medium, e.g. a CD ROM, floppy disk, ribbon tape or the like. The term "computer platform" encompasses the 35 main data processing and storage facility of a computer entity.

By use of a trusted component in each computing entity, there is enabled a level of trust between different computing platforms. It is possible to query such a platform about its state, and to compare it to a trusted state, either remotely, or through a monitor on the computer entity. The information gathered by such a query

5 is provided by the computing entity's trusted component which monitors the various parameters of the platform. Information provided by the trusted component can be authenticated by cryptographic authentication, and can be trusted.

The presence of the trusted component makes it possible for a piece of third party software, either remote or local to the computing entity to communicate with the

10 computing entity in order to obtain proof of its authenticity and identity and to retrieve measured integrity metrics of that computing entity. The third party software can then compare the metrics obtained from the trusted component against expected metrics in order to determine whether a state of the queried computing entity is appropriate for the interactions which the third party software item seeks to make

15 with the computing entity, for example commercial transaction processes.

This type of integrity verification between computing entities works well in the context of third party software communicating with a computing entity's trusted component, but does not provide a means for a human user to gain a level of trustworthy interaction with his or her computing entity, or any other computing entity

20 which that person may interact with by means of a user interface.

In a preferred implementation described herein, a trusted token device is used by a user to interrogate a computing entity's trusted component and to report to the user on the state of the computing entity, as verified by the trusted component.

25 A "trusted platform" used in preferred embodiments of the invention will now be described. This is achieved by the incorporation into a computing platform of a

physical trusted device whose function is to bind the identity of the platform to reliably measured data that provides an integrity metric of the platform. The identity and the integrity metric are compared with expected values provided by a trusted party (TP) that is prepared to vouch for the trustworthiness of the platform. If there is a match,

30 the implication is that at least part of the platform is operating correctly, depending on the scope of the integrity metric.

A user verifies the correct operation of the platform before exchanging other data with the platform. A user does this by requesting the trusted device to provide its identity and an integrity metric. (Optionally the trusted device will refuse to provide

35 evidence of identity if it itself was unable to verify correct operation of the platform.) The user receives the proof of identity and the identity metric, and compares them

against values which it believes to be true. Those proper values are provided by the TP or another entity that is trusted by the user. If data reported by the trusted device is the same as that provided by the TP, the user trusts the platform. This is because the user trusts the entity. The entity trusts the platform because it has previously 5 validated the identity and determined the proper integrity metric of the platform.

Once a user has established trusted operation of the platform, he exchanges other data with the platform. For a local user, the exchange might be by interacting with some software application running on the platform. For a remote user, the exchange might involve a secure transaction. In either case, the data exchanged is 10 'signed' by the trusted device. The user can then have greater confidence that data is being exchanged with a platform whose behaviour can be trusted.

The trusted device uses cryptographic processes but does not necessarily provide an external interface to those cryptographic processes. Also, a most desirable implementation would be to make the trusted device tamperproof, to 15 protect secrets by making them inaccessible to other platform functions and provide an environment that is substantially immune to unauthorised modification. Since tamper-proofing is impossible, the best approximation is a trusted device that is tamper-resistant, or tamper-detecting. The trusted device, therefore, preferably consists of one physical component that is tamper-resistant.

20 Techniques relevant to tamper-resistance are well known to those skilled in the art of security. These techniques include methods for resisting tampering (such as appropriate encapsulation of the trusted device), methods for detecting tampering (such as detection of out of specification voltages, X-rays, or loss of physical integrity in the trusted device casing), and methods for eliminating data when tampering is 25 detected. Further discussion of appropriate techniques can be found at <http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/tamper.html>. It will be appreciated that, although tamper-proofing is a most desirable feature of the present invention, it does not enter into the normal operation of the invention and, as such, is beyond the scope of the present invention and will not be described in any detail herein.

30 The trusted device is preferably a physical one because it must be difficult to forge. It is most preferably tamper-resistant because it must be hard to counterfeit. It typically has an engine capable of using cryptographic processes because it is required to prove identity, both locally and at a distance, and it contains at least one method of measuring some integrity metric of the platform with which it is associated.

35 A trusted platform 10 is illustrated in the diagram in Figure 1. The platform 10 includes the standard features of a keyboard 14 (which provides a user's

confirmation key), mouse 16 and monitor 18, which provide the physical 'user interface' of the platform. This embodiment of a trusted platform also contains a smart card reader 12. Along side the smart card reader 12, there is illustrated a smart card 19 to allow trusted user interaction with the trusted platform as shall be 5 described further below. In the platform 10, there are a plurality of modules 15: these are other functional elements of the trusted platform of essentially any kind appropriate to that platform.. The functional significance of such elements is not relevant to the present invention and will not be discussed further herein. Additional 10 components of the trusted computer entity will typically include one or more local area network (LAN) ports, one or more modem ports, and one or more power supplies, cooling fans and the like.

As illustrated in Figure 2, the motherboard 20 of the trusted computing platform 10 includes (among other standard components) a main processor 21, main memory 22, a trusted device 24, a data bus 26 and respective control lines 27 and 15 lines 28, BIOS memory 29 containing the BIOS program for the platform 10 and an Input/Output (IO) device 23, which controls interaction between the components of the motherboard and the smart card reader 12, the keyboard 14, the mouse 16 and the monitor 18 (and any additional peripheral devices such as a modem, printer, scanner or the like). The main memory 22 is typically random access memory 20 (RAM). In operation, the platform 10 loads the operating system, for example Windows NT™, into RAM from hard disk (not shown). Additionally, in operation, the platform 10 loads the processes or applications that may be executed by the platform 10 into RAM from hard disk (not shown).

The computer entity can be considered to have a logical, as well as a 25 physical, architecture. The logical architecture has a same basic division between the computer platform, and the trusted component, as is present with the physical architecture described in Figs. 1 to 4 herein. That is to say, the trusted component is logically distinct from the computer platform to which it is physically related. The computer entity comprises a user space being a logical space which is physically 30 resident on the computer platform (the first processor and first data storage means) and a trusted component space being a logical space which is physically resident on the trusted component. In the user space are one or a plurality of drivers, one or a plurality of applications programs, a file storage area; smart card reader; smart card interface; and a software agent which can perform operations in the user space and 35 report back to trusted component. The trusted component space is a logical area based upon and physically resident in the trusted component, supported by the

second data processor and second memory area of the trusted component. Monitor 18 receives images directly from the trusted component space. External to the computer entity are external communications networks e.g. the Internet, and various local area networks, wide area networks which are connected to the user space via 5 the drivers (which may include one or more modem ports). An external user smart card inputs into smart card reader in the user space.

Typically, in a personal computer the BIOS program is located in a special reserved memory area, the upper 64K of the first megabyte do the system memory (addresses F000h to FFFFh), and the main processor is arranged to look at this 10 memory location first, in accordance with an industry wide standard.

The significant difference between the platform and a conventional platform is that, after reset, the main processor is initially controlled by the trusted device, which then hands control over to the platform-specific BIOS program, which in turn initialises all input/output devices as normal. After the BIOS program has executed, 15 control is handed over as normal by the BIOS program to an operating system program, such as Windows NT (TM), which is typically loaded into main memory 22 from a hard disk drive (not shown).

Clearly, this change from the normal procedure requires a modification to the implementation of the industry standard, whereby the main processor 21 is directed 20 to address the trusted device 24 to receive its first instructions. This change may be made simply by hard-coding a different address into the main processor 21. Alternatively, the trusted device 24 may be assigned the standard BIOS program address, in which case there is no need to modify the main processor configuration.

It is highly desirable for the BIOS boot block to be contained within the trusted 25 device 24. This prevents subversion of the obtaining of the integrity metric (which could otherwise occur if rogue software processes are present) and prevents rogue software processes creating a situation in which the BIOS (even if correct) fails to build the proper environment for the operating system.

Although, in the preferred embodiment to be described, the trusted device 24 30 is a single, discrete component, it is envisaged that the functions of the trusted device 24 may alternatively be split into multiple devices on the motherboard, or even integrated into one or more of the existing standard devices of the platform. For example, it is feasible to integrate one or more of the functions of the trusted device into the main processor itself, provided that the functions and their communications 35 cannot be subverted. This, however, would probably require separate leads on the processor for sole use by the trusted functions. Additionally or alternatively, although

in the present embodiment the trusted device is a hardware device that is adapted for integration into the motherboard 20, it is anticipated that a trusted device may be implemented as a 'removable' device, such as a dongle, which could be attached to a platform when required. Whether the trusted device is integrated or removable is a 5 matter of design choice. However, where the trusted device is separable, a mechanism for providing a logical binding between the trusted device and the platform should be present.

The trusted device 24 comprises a number of blocks, as illustrated in Figure 3. After system reset, the trusted device 24 performs a secure boot process to 10 ensure that the operating system of the platform 10 (including the system clock and the display on the monitor) is running properly and in a secure manner. During the secure boot process, the trusted device 24 acquires an integrity metric of the computing platform 10. The trusted device 24 can also perform secure data transfer and, for example, authentication between it and a smart card via 15 encryption/decryption and signature/verification. The trusted device 24 can also securely enforce various security control policies, such as locking of the user interface.

Specifically, the trusted device comprises: a controller 30 programmed to control the overall operation of the trusted device 24, and interact with the other 20 functions on the trusted device 24 and with the other devices on the motherboard 20; a measurement function 31 for acquiring the integrity metric from the platform 10; a cryptographic function 32 for signing, encrypting or decrypting specified data; an authentication function 33 for authenticating a smart card; and interface circuitry 34 having appropriate ports (36, 37 & 38) for connecting the trusted device 24 25 respectively to the data bus 26, control lines 27 and address lines 28 of the motherboard 20. Each of the blocks in the trusted device 24 has access (typically via the controller 30) to appropriate volatile memory areas 4 and/or non-volatile memory areas 3 of the trusted device 24. Additionally, the trusted device 24 is designed, in a known manner, to be tamper resistant.

30 For reasons of performance, the trusted device 24 may be implemented as an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC). However, for flexibility, the trusted device 24 is preferably an appropriately programmed micro-controller. Both ASICs and micro-controllers are well known in the art of microelectronics and will not be considered herein in any further detail.

35 One item of data stored in the non-volatile memory 3 of the trusted device 24 is a certificate 350. The certificate 350 contains at least a public key 351 of the

trusted device 24 and an authenticated value 352 of the platform integrity metric measured by a trusted party (TP). The certificate 350 is signed by the TP using the TP's private key prior to it being stored in the trusted device 24. In later communications sessions, a user of the platform 10 can verify the integrity of the platform 10 by comparing the acquired integrity metric with the authentic integrity metric 352. If there is a match, the user can be confident that the platform 10 has not been subverted. Knowledge of the TP's generally-available public key enables simple verification of the certificate 350. The non-volatile memory 35 also contains an identity (ID) label 353. The ID label 353 is a conventional ID label, for example a serial number, that is unique within some context. The ID label 353 is generally used for indexing and labelling of data relevant to the trusted device 24, but is insufficient in itself to prove the identity of the platform 10 under trusted conditions.

The trusted device 24 is equipped with at least one method of reliably measuring or acquiring the integrity metric of the computing platform 10 with which it is associated. In the present embodiment, the integrity metric is acquired by the measurement function 31 by generating a digest of the BIOS instructions in the BIOS memory. Such an acquired integrity metric, if verified as described above, gives a potential user of the platform 10 a high level of confidence that the platform 10 has not been subverted at a hardware, or BIOS program, level. Other known processes, for example virus checkers, will typically be in place to check that the operating system and application program code has not been subverted.

The measurement function 31 has access to: non-volatile memory 3 for storing a hash program 354 and a private key 355 of the trusted device 24, and volatile memory 4 for storing acquired integrity metric in the form of a digest 361. In appropriate embodiments, the volatile memory 4 may also be used to store the public keys and associated ID labels 360a-360n of one or more authentic smart cards 19s that can be used to gain access to the platform 10.

In one preferred implementation, as well as the digest, the integrity metric includes a Boolean value, which is stored in volatile memory 4 by the measurement function 31, for reasons that will become apparent.

A preferred process for acquiring an integrity metric will now be described with reference to Figure 4.

In step 400, at switch-on, the measurement function 31 monitors the activity of the main processor 21 on the data, control and address lines (26, 27 & 28) to determine whether the trusted device 24 is the first memory accessed. Under conventional operation, a main processor would first be directed to the BIOS memory

first in order to execute the BIOS program. However, in accordance with the present embodiment, the main processor 21 is directed to the trusted device 24, which acts as a memory. In step 405, if the trusted device 24 is the first memory accessed, in step 410, the measurement function 31 writes to volatile memory 3 a Boolean value which indicates that the trusted device 24 was the first memory accessed. Otherwise, in step 415, the measurement function writes a Boolean value which indicates that the trusted device 24 was not the first memory accessed.

In the event the trusted device 24 is not the first accessed, there is of course a chance that the trusted device 24 will not be accessed at all. This would be the case, for example, if the main processor 21 were manipulated to run the BIOS program first. Under these circumstances, the platform would operate, but would be unable to verify its integrity on demand, since the integrity metric would not be available. Further, if the trusted device 24 were accessed after the BIOS program had been accessed, the Boolean value would clearly indicate lack of integrity of the platform.

In step 420, when (or if) accessed as a memory by the main processor 21, the main processor 21 reads the stored native hash instructions 354 from the measurement function 31 in step 425. The hash instructions 354 are passed for processing by the main processor 21 over the data bus 26. In step 430, main processor 21 executes the hash instructions 354 and uses them, in step 435, to compute a digest of the BIOS memory 29, by reading the contents of the BIOS memory 29 and processing those contents according to the hash program. In step 440, the main processor 21 writes the computed digest 361 to the appropriate non-volatile memory location 4 in the trusted device 24. The measurement function 31, in step 445, then calls the BIOS program in the BIOS memory 29, and execution continues in a conventional manner.

Clearly, there are a number of different ways in which the integrity metric may be calculated, depending upon the scope of the trust required. The measurement of the BIOS program's integrity provides a fundamental check on the integrity of a platform's underlying processing environment. The integrity metric should be of such a form that it will enable reasoning about the validity of the boot process - the value of the integrity metric can be used to verify whether the platform booted using the correct BIOS. Optionally, individual functional blocks within the BIOS could have their own digest values, with an ensemble BIOS digest being a digest of these individual digests. This enables a policy to state which parts of BIOS operation are critical for an intended purpose, and which are irrelevant (in which case the individual

digests must be stored in such a manner that validity of operation under the policy can be established).

Other integrity checks could involve establishing that various other devices, components or apparatus attached to the platform are present and in correct working

- 5 order. In one example, the BIOS programs associated with a SCSI controller could be verified to ensure communications with peripheral equipment could be trusted. In another example, the integrity of other devices, for example memory devices or co-processors, on the platform could be verified by enacting fixed challenge/response interactions to ensure consistent results. Where the trusted device 24 is a separable
- 10 component, some such form of interaction is desirable to provide an appropriate logical binding between the trusted device 14 and the platform. Also, although in the present embodiment the trusted device 24 utilises the data bus as its main means of communication with other parts of the platform, it would be feasible, although not so convenient, to provide alternative communications paths, such as hard-wired paths
- 15 or optical paths. Further, although in the present embodiment the trusted device 24 instructs the main processor 21 to calculate the integrity metric in other embodiments, the trusted device itself is arranged to measure one or more integrity metrics.

Preferably, the BIOS boot process includes mechanisms to verify the integrity

- 20 of the boot process itself. Such mechanisms are already known from, for example, Intel's draft "Wired for Management baseline specification v 2.0 - BOOT Integrity Service", and involve calculating digests of software or firmware before loading that software or firmware. Such a computed digest is compared with a value stored in a certificate provided by a trusted entity, whose public key is known to the BIOS. The
- 25 software/firmware is then loaded only if the computed value matches the expected value from the certificate, and the certificate has been proven valid by use of the trusted entity's public key. Otherwise, an appropriate exception handling routine is invoked.

Optionally, after receiving the computed BIOS digest, the trusted device 24

- 30 may inspect the proper value of the BIOS digest in the certificate and not pass control to the BIOS if the computed digest does not match the proper value. Additionally, or alternatively, the trusted device 24 may inspect the Boolean value and not pass control back to the BIOS if the trusted device 24 was not the first memory accessed. In either of these cases, an appropriate exception handling
- 35 routine may be invoked.

Figure 5 illustrates the flow of actions by a TP, the trusted device 24 incorporated into a platform, and a user (of a remote platform) who wants to verify the integrity of the trusted platform. It will be appreciated that substantially the same steps as are depicted in Figure 5 are involved when the user is a local user. In either 5 case, the user would typically rely on some form of software application to enact the verification. It would be possible to run the software application on the remote platform or the trusted platform. However, there is a chance that, even on the remote platform, the software application could be subverted in some way. Therefore, it is preferred that, for a high level of integrity, the software application would reside on a 10 smart card of the user, who would insert the smart card into an appropriate reader for the purposes of verification. The present invention relates to such an arrangement.

At the first instance, a TP, which vouches for trusted platforms, will inspect the type of the platform to decide whether to vouch for it or not. This will be a matter of policy. If all is well, in step 500, the TP measures the value of integrity metric of 15 the platform. Then, the TP generates a certificate, in step 505, for the platform. The certificate is generated by the TP by appending the trusted device's public key, and optionally its ID label, to the measured integrity metric, and signing the string with the TP's private key.

The trusted device 24 can subsequently prove its identity by using its private 20 key to process some input data received from the user and produce output data, such that the input/output pair is statistically impossible to produce without knowledge of the private key. Hence, knowledge of the private key forms the basis of identity in this case. Clearly, it would be feasible to use symmetric encryption to form the basis of identity. However, the disadvantage of using symmetric encryption 25 is that the user would need to share his secret with the trusted device. Further, as a result of the need to share the secret with the user, while symmetric encryption would in principle be sufficient to prove identity to the user, it would insufficient to prove identity to a third party, who could not be entirely sure the verification originated from the trusted device or the user.

In step 510, the trusted device 24 is initialised by writing the certificate 350 into the appropriate non-volatile memory locations 3 of the trusted device 24. This is done, preferably, by secure communication with the trusted device 24 after it is installed in the motherboard 20. The method of writing the certificate to the trusted device 24 is analogous to the method used to initialise smart cards by writing private 35 keys thereto. The secure communications is supported by a 'master key', known only to the TP, that is written to the trusted device (or smart card) during

manufacture, and used to enable the writing of data to the trusted device 24; writing of data to the trusted device 24 without knowledge of the master key is not possible.

At some later point during operation of the platform, for example when it is switched on or reset, in step 515, the trusted device 24 acquires and stores the 5 integrity metric 361 of the platform.

When a user wishes to communicate with the platform, in step 520, he creates a nonce, such as a random number, and, in step 525, challenges the trusted device 24 (the operating system of the platform, or an appropriate software application, is arranged to recognise the challenge and pass it to the trusted device

10 24, typically via a BIOS-type call, in an appropriate fashion). The nonce is used to protect the user from deception caused by replay of old but genuine signatures (called a 'replay attack') by untrustworthy platforms. The process of providing a nonce and verifying the response is an example of the well-known 'challenge/response' process.

15 In step 530, the trusted device 24 receives the challenge and creates an appropriate response. This may be a digest of the measured integrity metric and the nonce, and optionally its ID label. Then, in step 535, the trusted device 24 signs the digest, using its private key, and returns the signed digest, accompanied by the certificate 350, to the user.

20 In step 540, the user receives the challenge response and verifies the certificate using the well known public key of the TP. The user then, in step 550, extracts the trusted device's 24 public key from the certificate and uses it to decrypt the signed digest from the challenge response. Then, in step 560, the user verifies the nonce inside the challenge response. Next, in step 570, the user compares the 25 computed integrity metric, which it extracts from the challenge response, with the proper platform integrity metric, which it extracts from the certificate. If any of the foregoing verification steps fails, in steps 545, 555, 565 or 575, the whole process ends in step 580 with no further communications taking place.

Assuming all is well, in steps 585 and 590, the user and the trusted platform 30 use other protocols to set up secure communications for other data, where the data from the platform is preferably signed by the trusted device 24.

Further refinements of this verification process are possible. It is desirable that the challenger becomes aware, through the challenge, both of the value of the platform integrity metric and also of the method by which it was obtained. Both these 35 pieces of information are desirable to allow the challenger to make a proper decision about the integrity of the platform. The challenger also has many different options

available - it may accept that the integrity metric is recognised as valid in the trusted device 24, or may alternatively only accept that the platform has the relevant level of integrity if the value of the integrity metric is equal to a value held by the challenger (or may hold there to be different levels of trust in these two cases).

5 The techniques of signing, using certificates, and challenge/response, and using them to prove identity, are well known to those skilled in the art of security and therefore need not be described in any more detail herein.

10 The user's smart card 19 is a token device, separate from the computing entity, which interacts with the computing entity via the smart card reader port 19. A user may have several different smart cards issued by several different vendors or service providers, and may gain access to the internet or a plurality of network computers from any one of a plurality of computing entities as described herein, which are provided with a trusted component and smart card reader. A user's trust in the individual computing entity to which s/he is using is derived from the interaction

15 between the user's trusted smart card token and the trusted component of the computing entity. The user relies on their trusted smart card token to verify the trustworthiness of the trusted component.

20 A processing part 60 of a user smart card 19 is illustrated in Figure 6. As shown, the user smart card 19 processing part 60 has the standard features of a processor 61, memory 62 and interface contacts 63. The processor 61 is programmed for simple challenge/response operations involving authentication of the user smart card 19 and verification of the platform 10, as will be described below. The memory 62 contains its private key 620, its public key 628, (optionally) a user profile 621, the public key 622 of the TP and an identity 627. The user profile 621

25 lists the allowable auxiliary smart cards 20 AC1-ACn usable by the user, and the individual security policy 624 for the user. For each auxiliary smart card 20, the user profile includes respective identification information 623, the trust structure 625 between the smart cards (if one exists) and, optionally, the type or make 626 of the smart card.

30 In the user profile 621, each auxiliary smart card 20 entry AC1-ACn includes associated identification information 623, which varies in dependence upon the type of card. For example, identification information for a cash card typically includes a simple serial number, whereas, for a crypto card, the identification information typically comprises the public key (or certificate) of the crypto card (the private key being stored secretly on the crypto card itself).

The 'security policy' 624 dictates the permissions that the user has on the platform 10 while using an auxiliary smart card 20. For example, the user interface may be locked or unlocked while an auxiliary smart card 20 is in use, depending on the function of the auxiliary smart card 20. Additionally, or alternatively, certain files or executable programs on the platform 10 may be made accessible or not, depending on how trusted a particular auxiliary smart card 20 is. Further, the security policy 624 may specify a particular mode of operation for the auxiliary smart card 20, such as 'credit receipt' or 'temporary delegation', as will be described below.

A 'trust structure' 625 defines whether an auxiliary smart card 20 can itself 'introduce' further auxiliary smart cards 20 into the system without first re-using the user smart card 19. In the embodiments described in detail herein, the only defined trust structure is between the user smart card 19 and the auxiliary smart cards 20 that can be introduced to the platform 10 by the user smart card 19. Introduction may be 'single session' or 'multi-session', as will be described below. However, there is no reason why certain auxiliary smart cards 20 could not in practice introduce further auxiliary smart cards 20. This would require an auxiliary smart card 20 to have an equivalent of a user profile listing the or each auxiliary smart card that it is able to introduce.

Use of auxiliary smart cards 20 is not a necessary feature of the present invention, and is not described further in the present application. Use of auxiliary smart cards is the subject of the present applicant's copending International Patent Application of even date entitled "Computing Apparatus and Methods of Operating Computing Apparatus", which is incorporated by reference herein.

A preferred process for authentication between a user smart card 19 and a platform 10 will now be described with reference to the flow diagram in Figure 7. As will be described, the process conveniently implements a challenge/response routine. There exist many available challenge/response mechanisms. The implementation of an authentication protocol used in the present embodiment is mutual (or 3-step) authentication, as described in ISO/IEC 9798-3. Of course, there is no reason why other authentication procedures cannot be used, for example 2-step or 4-step, as also described in ISO/IEC 9798-3.

Initially, the user inserts their user smart card 19 into the smart card reader 12 of the platform 10 in step 700. Beforehand, the platform 10 will typically be operating under the control of its standard operating system and executing the authentication process, which waits for a user to insert their user smart card 19. Apart from the smart card reader 12 being active in this way, the platform 10 is typically rendered

inaccessible to users by 'locking' the user interface (i.e. the screen, keyboard and mouse).

When the user smart card 19 is inserted into the smart card reader 12, the trusted device 24 is triggered to attempt mutual authentication in step by generating and transmitting a nonce A to the user smart card 19 in step 705. A nonce, such as a random number, is used to protect the originator from deception caused by replay of old but genuine responses (called a 'replay attack') by untrustworthy third parties.

5 In response, in step 710, the user smart card 19 generates and returns a response comprising the concatenation of: the plain text of the nonce A, a new nonce B generated by the user smart card 19, the ID 353 of the trusted device 24 and some redundancy; the signature of the plain text, generated by signing the plain text with the private key of the user smart card 19; and a certificate containing the ID and the public key of the user smart card 19.

10 The trusted device 24 authenticates the response by using the public key in the certificate to verify the signature of the plain text in step 715. If the response is not authentic, the process ends in step 720. If the response is authentic, in step 725 15 the trusted device 24 generates and sends a further response including the concatenation of: the plain text of the nonce A, the nonce B, the ID 627 of the user smart card 19 and the acquired integrity metric; the signature of the plain text, generated by signing the plain text using the private key of the trusted device 24; and the certificate comprising the public key of the trusted device 24 and the authentic 20 integrity metric, both signed by the private key of the TP.

25 The user smart card 19 authenticates this response by using the public key of the TP and comparing the acquired integrity metric with the authentic integrity metric, where a match indicates successful verification, in step 730. If the further response is not authentic, the process ends in step 735.

30 If the procedure is successful, both the trusted device 24 has authenticated the user smart card 19 and the user smart card 19 has verified the integrity of the trusted platform 10 and, in step 740, the authentication process executes the secure process for the user. Then, the authentication process sets an interval timer in step 745. Thereafter, using appropriate operating system interrupt routines, the authentication process services the interval timer periodically to detect when the timer meets or exceeds a pre-determined timeout period in step 750.

35 Clearly, the authentication process and the interval timer run in parallel with the secure process.

When the timeout period is met or exceeded, the authentication process triggers the trusted device 24 to re-authenticate the user smart card 19, by transmitting a challenge for the user smart card 19 to identify itself in step 760. The user smart card 19 returns a certificate including its ID 627 and its public key 628 in 5 step 765. In step 770, if there is no response (for example, as a result of the user smart card 19 having been removed) or the certificate is no longer valid for some reason (for example, the user smart card has been replaced with a different smart card), the session is terminated by the trusted device 24 in step 775. Otherwise, in step 770, the process from step 745 repeats by resetting the interval timer.

10 Several different implementations of the invention are possible. In a preferred first implementation, the monitor 18 may be driven directly by a monitor subsystem contained within the trusted component itself. In this embodiment, in the trusted component space are resident the trusted component itself, and displays generated by the trusted component on monitor 18. This arrangement is described further in 15 the applicant's copending European Patent Application No. 99304164.9, entitled "System for Digitally Signing a Document" and filed on 28 May 1999 (and any patent applications claiming priority therefrom), which is incorporated by reference herein.

20 In a preferred first implementation, this subsystem resides on the computer platform, and provides interfaces between the smartcard reader, the trusted component, and the monitor. The subsystem functionality is built into the trusted component, and resides within the trusted space. The subsystem interfaces between the computer platform and smartcard, and the trusted component.

25 The subsystem is not critical for maintaining trust in the trusted component, in other implementations, the subsystem optionally can reside on the computer platform in the 'untrusted' computer platform space.

30 In a second implementation, the trusted component (device) is accessed via the smart card reader 19 and smart card interface via a software subsystem. The subsystem also provides an application interface function for interfacing between applications and the trusted component; and a verification application for verifying via a third party accessed over the internet, or via a local area network/wide area network, integrity metrics data obtained by trusted component.

The trust placed in the computer entity by a user is composed of three separate parts;

- 35 • Trust placed in the user's trusted token device.
- The trust placed in the trusted component.

As described herein, levels or degrees of trust placed in the computer entity are determined as being relative to a level of trust which is placed in the trusted component and the smart card. Although the amount of trust in a computer entity is related to many factors, a key factor in measuring that trust are the types, extent and regularity of integrity metrics checks which the trusted component itself carries out on the computer entity, and the type, regularity and quality of the checks the smart card makes on the trusted component.

Once the user has established by use of their smart card that the trusted component is operating correctly, the trusted component is implicitly trusted. The trusted component is embedded as the root of any trust which is placed in the computing platform and the computing platform as a whole cannot be any more trusted than the amount of trust placed in the trusted component.

Although other computing entities can interact directly with a trusted component, by means of encrypted messages, to verify the operation of a trusted component, a human user operating a computing entity cannot directly interface with a trusted component, because the human user is a biological entity who is not capable of generating digital encrypted signals. The human user must rely on his visual and audio senses to verify the trustworthiness of a computing entity. The human user, in the general case, has no knowledge of the mechanisms at work inside the computing entity, and in the general case will be of an average level of education and sophistication, that is to say a normal average person.

The user is therefore provided with a trusted token in the form of a smart card, in which the user may place a high degree of trust. The user's smart card can interact with the trusted component of the computer entity in order to:

- Prove the identity of a trusted component to the user.
- Verify that the computer platform inside the computing entity is operating correctly, by virtue of integrity metrics measurement carried out on the computer platform by the trusted component.

30

Therefore, in the system of computing entities, there are chains of trust involved as follows:

- The user must trust the trusted token. This trust is based upon the reputation of the provider of the trusted token, who will typically be a corporation having access

to the necessary technical and engineering resources to enable correct operation of the trusted token.

• Trust between the trusted token and trusted component. The trusted token smartcard must be able to verify correct operation of the trusted component using the smartcard.

• Trust in the computer platform. The trust in the computer platform derives from the monitoring of the computer platform by the trusted component, which is itself trusted.

10 Within this chain of trust, the link between the user and a computer entity can be viewed from the perspective of the user, the trusted platform which the user is using, and from the perspective of the trusted token (the smart card), as described hereunder.

15 From the user's point-of-view, the user can only trust what s/he sees on the computer screen, and what s/he hears on the computer's audio output and/or printed output. The user is provided with a trusted token in the form of a smart card 19 which can be inserted into smart card reader 12 of the computing entity. The smart card carries out interactions using cryptographic messages and interrogations on behalf of the user. The smart card is capable of initiating a request to the trusted 20 component to perform integrity metrics, and is capable of denying authorization to application programs in the event that the smart card does not receive a satisfactory response to a request for verification from a trusted component.

25 Specific implementations for carrying out the invention are described: in each, the computing entity has a plurality of possible modes of operation.

Referring to Fig. 8 herein, there is illustrated a first mode of operation of a computer system comprising a computing entity and a smart card under control of a user following a first process. In the process of Fig. 8, there is no application residing on the computing entity which requires use of the user's smart card. The user is simply verifying the trustworthiness of the computing platform within the computer 30 entity with the aid of the smart card. In general, a user will wish to check the integrity of a computing entity as soon as the user logs on, and before the user performs any sensitive operations. The smart card can be programmed to verify the integrity of the computing entity, via its trusted component, before the user carries out any other tasks using the computing entity. In step 7000, a user inserts the smart card into the smart card reader of the computing entity which s/he is to use. In step 7010, the user 35 starts to use the graphical user interface of the computing platform. In step 7020, a

verification application whose purpose is to enable a user having a smart card to check the integrity of a trusted component of the computing entity and which is pre-loaded onto the computer platform, is activated by the user. Such activation may be by activating a pointing device, e.g. a mouse or track-ball which is visually placed

- 5 over an icon displayed on a visual display of the computing entity. The verification interface receives the commands from the graphical user interface for initiating a check of the trusted component by the smart card and processes these into instructions in a form in which the smart card can be instructed by the application to commence a verification process. In step 7030, the interface sends a request signal
- 10 to the smart card requesting the smart card to commence a verification operation on the trusted component. In step 7040, the smart card carries out integrity checks on the trusted component. All communications between the smart card and the trusted component are in encrypted format. The precise method by which the smart card verifies the integrity of the trusted component is by the challenge-response integrity
- 15 check method described with reference to Figures 5 and 7 above. In step 7050 the smart card, having completed the integrity check on the trusted component reports back to the user by displaying on the graphical user interface. The trusted component may report back to the user using the graphical user interface by a variety of methods, some of which are the subject of separate patent applications by
- 20 the applicant, and which are outside the scope of this disclosure.

In one such method, the smart card uses the trusted component to control the display on the monitor 18 to display information describing the computer platform, which has been determined by the trusted component, and in which an image specific to the smart card is displayed on the visual display unit. For example, the smart card may contain a difficult to recreate image data, preferably known only to the user. The trusted component may retrieve this image data from the smart card and display it on the monitor, combined with other information describing integrity metrics and operation of the computer platform. Because the computing entity has no other way of obtaining the image data except from the user's smart card, where it is pre-stored, and because the user can visually identify with a high degree of accuracy that the image is genuine, by visual inspection, the user then has confidence that the computing entity has in fact interacted with the smart card (otherwise the image would not be obtainable).

- 25
- 30

Alternatively, in step 7050, instead of the image data being displayed on the monitor of a computing entity which is being checked, the user may remove his smart card from the smart card reader, and insert the smart card into his own palmtop

- 35

device. The palmtop device is personal to the user, and therefore the user may trust the palmtop device to a higher extent than the computer entity. The palmtop reader reads data from the smart card verifying that the computer entity has passed the challenge-response tests made by the smart card. The palmtop computer then 5 displays to the user the information that the computer entity has passed the challenge-response test set by the smart card. The user takes this as verification that the computing entity is trusted.

The above method operates where a user wishes to use a computing entity, and simply wishes to know whether the computing entity can be trusted. By contrast, 10 Figure 9 shows schematically a second mode of operation in a case where an application resident on the computing entity, or resident on a remote computing entity with which the user wishes to communicate, requires that a user authorizes an operation, for example a commercial transaction operation.

The smart card is configured by a system administrator, or smart card service 15 provider with details particular to the user. In step 800, the user inserts the smart card into the smart card reader of the computing entity. In step 801 the application or the operating system of the computing entity requests data from the smart card. In step 803, the smart card responds by sending a delay message to the computing entity, and requesting from the computing entity access to the computing entity's 20 trusted component, so that the smart card can verify the integrity of the computing entity. In step 804, the smart card corresponds with the trusted component of the computing entity by means of integrity checks according to a challenge-response process as described herein above, to check the integrity of the computing entity. In step 805, if the smart card determines that the integrity checks have been satisfied 25 by the trusted component, the smart card proceeds to respond to the request from the operating system or application for completing the operation.

The smart card is programmed in such a way that the smart card will never accept an interaction with an application, for example for the purposes of authentication, or to provide some cryptographic services, unless it can first verify the 30 integrity of the computing entity to which it is connected by means of correspondence with a trusted component of the computing entity, in which the trusted component authenticates and checks integrity metrics of the computing platform. In this way, the user, who implicitly trusts the smart card, is confident that his smart card will only accept to be used by an application once it has verified that it is in a trusted 35 environment. The smart card does not need to explicitly report the results of the integrity checks to the user. The mere fact that an application has requested an

interaction with a smart card and that requested interaction has been satisfied is proof that the smart card has been able to carry out this check and is satisfied with the result. Whether the smart card accepts or rejects an interaction with an application is based upon pre-determined policies which are pre-programmed onto 5 the smart card by the smart card issuer, or which can be configured by a user by programming the smart card.

Configuration of the smart card memory may be made by a user if this facility is provided by a smart card vendor. For example a purchaser of a personal computer may be able to configure his own smart card to operate according to user 10 preferences. The smart card may be pre-configured such that a user may be able to program the smart card to interact with a computing entity in a Microsoft Windows™ environment, even where a trusted component does not exist in a computing entity. A smart card vendor may enable programming of a smart card through a device such as a PDA palmtop computer. The precise configuration of the capabilities of each 15 smart card are specified by the smart card provider as a design issue.

As another example, an internet service provider may provide a smart card which only identifies itself correctly to the internet service provider, when it can verify that the computing entity into which it is inserted, has passed various integrity checks specified by the smart card. This provides protection for the internet service provider, 20 to be able to confirm that a user will not connect to the internet service using an untrusted computer, which may be carrying viruses.

A feature of the above two methods is that they do not require initiation by user interaction, but are initiated by the action of the smart card being entered into the smart card reader of a computer entity. This is not essential to the invention, which is 25 also applicable to initiation by user interaction or even by software applications. Examples of such arrangements will be described further below.

Referring to Fig. 9 herein, there will now be described one example of an operation of the computer entity during its interaction with a smart card adapted as a trusted token. This example is based upon known technology according to the 30 PCSC specification found in standard ISO 7816, and viewable at www.pcscworkgroup.com, which in a preferred arrangement is modified to allow initiation of commands from the smart card.

Interaction between a smart card and the trusted component allows the smart card to authenticate the correct operation of the trusted component, and to obtain the 35 trusted components response regarding integrity of the computer platform which the trusted component monitors. In a preferred implementation, the integrity verification

process allows that the trusted component reports an interpreted result of a verification of correct operation of the computing entity to the smart card. However in another mode of implementation the trusted component may not provide the mechanism to interpret the integrity measurements for the smart card. In that case

5 the smart card must have access to a trusted third party server which provides this functionality.

Typically access to a trusted third party server by the smart card will require the presence of a mechanism so that the smart card can request such access to be provided by the computing entity.

10 Assuming you have a smart card which can initiate a command to a trusted component, communicate with the trusted component for exchange of messages and information, send requests for information, receive results from the trusted component in response to those requests, and request access to third party server to be provided by the computing entity then integrity verification of the trusted

15 component to the smart card can be achieved. Implementation of initiation of user commands from a smart card is known in "smartcards - from security tokens to intelligent adjuncts", by Boris Balacheff, Bruno Van Wilder, and David Chan published in CARDIS 1998 Proceedings.

20 The interactions involved in initiation of user commands from a smart card in accordance with Balacheff et al is briefly discussed with reference to Figure 9 (for fuller implementational detail the reader is referred to the article itself). The approach used is essentially similar to that used in GSM (specification GSM 11.14) to allow a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) to initiate actions to be taken by mobile equipment.

25 The functional role taken by mobile equipment in this arrangement is taken by what can be termed a PC Intelligent Adjunct (PCIA) module 900 within the platform - the smart card 901 interacts with this module. Firstly in step 902, the PCIA module makes essentially any command (C1). The results of the C1 command are fed back to the PCIA module in step 903., followed by a status response "91 XX" in step 904 - this key step (an alternative to the normal "OK" code) enables the smart card 901 to

30 advise the PCIA module 900 that it has information to send, and the length (XX) of the response data. The PCIA module then requests this additional data through a FETCH in step 905, with the result that a command C2 is provided by the smart card in step 906 and a result returned in step 907. An acknowledgement is provided by the smart card in step 908 - advantageously, an acknowledgement should then also

35 be provided by the PCIA module (not shown).

Referring to Fig. 11 herein, there is illustrated schematically a system of computer apparatus comprising a computing entity 1100 comprising a computer platform and a monitoring component as described herein before; a trusted token device 1101 capable of communicating with computing entity 1100; and a remote server 1102 capable of carrying out data processing functionality. The remote server 1102, also comprises a second computing platform and second monitoring component. In use, the remote server 1102 may be managed by a reliable service provider, for example an internet service provider, in which a user of a trusted token device may have a degree of trust established through, for example, a contractual relationship with the internet service provider, such as subscribing to a service provided by the internet service provider.

Referring to Fig. 12 herein, there is illustrated schematically a third mode of operation of a token device and a computing entity within the system of computers illustrated in Fig. 11. In this mode of operation, a monitoring component (trusted component) within the computing entity 1100 is requested by the smart card 1101 to provide a set of data checks on the computer platform within the computing entity 1100. Trusted token device 1101 may not have a sufficiently high data processing capability to carry out data processing on data supplied by the computer entity 1100. Therefore, the computer entity sends the integrity metrics data to a remote server 1102 trusted by smart card, which verifies that the integrity metrics data supplied by the monitoring component is correct by comparing this with a set of expected integrity metrics. The expected integrity metrics may be either supplied by the monitoring component itself, from pre-stored data within that component, or where the computer platform is of a common type, the trusted server 1102 may store sets of expected integrity metrics for that type of computer platform. In either case, the trusted server 1102 performs the heavy computational data processing required for verification of the integrity metrics with the expected integrity metrics, and digitally signs the result of this verification.

Dependent upon how the token device is pre-programmed and the amount of data processing capability resident on the trusted token device, various alternative versions of this third mode of operation are available.

In step 1200, the trusted token authenticates the trusted component as described herein before. In step 1201 the smart card requests the trusted component to verify the integrity metrics of the computer platform, and to report back to the smart card. In step 1202, the trusted component, having available the integrity metrics data as part of its ongoing monitoring of the computer platform, sends the

integrity metrics data to the smart card, along with a set of certified expected integrity metrics for that computer platform. In step 1203, the smart card sends the received integrity metrics data and the certified expected integrity metrics data to the trusted third party server for computation. This message also includes an identification of 5 the smart card device itself. Sending of the integrity metrics data and expected integrity metrics data from the smart card to the trusted server is via the computer entity itself, which routes the data, for example over the internet, to the remote trusted server 1102. In step 1204, the server processes the integrity metrics data, and verifies that the certified expected integrity metrics are currently certified, and 10 compares it with the expected integrity metrics data received from the smart card. This is a heavy computational step, for which the trusted server is suited to. In step 1205, having compared the integrity metrics data with the expected integrity metrics data, the server may then send a verification data back to the smart card via the computer entity. The verification data may comprise a digital signature of the server. 15 In step 1206, the smart card receives the verification data comprising a data signature and either accepts or rejects that digital signature as being valid, and therefore the verification data.

In one alternative arrangement, the trusted component may communicate directly with a third party server. Instead of steps 1202 and 1203, the trusted 20 component sends the set of measured integrity metrics of the computer platform to a third party (the trusted component either knows which third party server will be trusted by the smart card or the smart card needs to specify which third party server should be used), together with the trusted component's own digital signature, and receives from the third party server the result of the verification of these integrity 25 metrics and together with a digital signature. The third party server compares the set of integrity metrics received from the trusted component with its own stored set or a retrieved set of expected integrity metrics for the type of computer platform identified by the trusted component and adding its digital signature. The trusted component, having received the digital signature, then sends the set of integrity metrics together 30 with the digital signature to the smart card.

From the perspective of the smart card, any application which interacts with the smart card, either a graphical user interface, or another application, must be aware of the fact that the smart card may request an interaction with a trusted component of a platform. In the case where the smart card will require to interact with a third party 35 computing entity the application which interacts with the smart card must also allow the smart card to interact with a network server. However, in a preferred

implementation, the smart card should be able to request access to integrity verification data of a computer platform independently from the application to which it is talking to on a computer entity.

Upon receiving a request from an application of a computing entity to use a 5 functionality of the smart card, for example to authorize a transaction, the smart card may initiate a request for the monitoring component to supply monitoring information on the trustworthiness of the state of the computer platform. Communication between the smart card and the trusted component is by way of a protocol module resident on the computer platform which is responsible for communications between the 10 computing entity and the smart card token device. When an application on the PC requires access to the smart card, the protocol stack handles these communications. The computing entity can therefore filter commands which come from the card and are independent from the computing entity application such as checking the integrity of the computer platform, and can accommodate commands which come from the 15 smart card. From the point of view of the application, interactions of the smart card with other resources on the computing entity are transparent. This can be done using the technology in "smartcards - from security tokens to intelligent adjuncts", by Boris Balacheff, Bruno Van Wilder, and David Chan published in CARDIS 1998 Proceedings merged with PCSC technology.

20 Step 1201 may thus be initiated by the smart card as a result of one of a number of different trigger events. One possible trigger is the receipt by the smart card of a request from the graphical user interface, via the monitor subsystem, to check the trustworthiness of the platform. This signal is generated by the graphical user interface in response to keystroke inputs and/or pointing device inputs from a 25 user. Alternatively, the smart card may receive a request for access to functionality generated by an application either resident on the local computing entity, or resident on a remote computing entity. Verification of integrity then proceeds essentially as shown above with respect to Figure 12.

Ideally, the server is bound with the smart card: for example both the server 30 and the smart card may be issued by the same vendor, or body, such as an internet service provider.

For example, where the smart card is provided by an internet service provider, and the smart card is unable to authenticate the trustworthiness of a computing entity, then the internet service provider may either refuse to communicate with the 35 computing entity, or may provide a limited set of functionality, such as those available

to the general public, to the computing entity, rather than a full set of services available only to registered subscribers.

Having provided the trusted component, in one specific implementation according to the present invention, the remaining elements necessary for the smart card and the application to communicate with each other may be provided by essentially routine modifications to conventional applications. The necessary interaction may be provided with, for example, a conventional smart card pre-programmed to respond to a poll signal from an application by initiating a request to a trusted component to perform integrity metrics checks.

Referring to Fig. 13 herein, there is illustrated schematically elements of a possible first generation implementation of a system according to the present invention. Fig. 13 shows a logical view of components of first generation implementation. A trusted component 1500 comprises a processor and memory physically separated from a computer platform and resident in a trusted logical space as hereinbefore described. The computer platform comprises a further processor and data storage means and is resident in a computer platform space 1501. Subsystem 1502 and applications 1503 reside in the computer space 1501. Subsystem 1502 contains an application interface 1503, a verification application 1504, and a smart card interface 1505. The smart card interface communicates with smart card reader 1506 which is also in the computer platform space 1501, which accepts smart card 1507. The application interface 1503, contains the PCIA stack.

Referring to Fig. 14 herein, there is illustrated schematically a method of operation of the first generation implementation of Fig. 13 herein, for smart card 1507 interacting with the trusted component prior to giving a functionality 'X' in response to a request for functionality 'X' from an application. In this method of operation, calls to the PCSC stack could be done through the PCIA stack in order to provide the PCIA functionality transparently. In the best mode, the PCSC stack would incorporate the PCIA stack and functionality. In step 1600 the application sends the request for functionality 'X' to the smart card via the PCSC stack resident in the application interface 1503 in the subsystem 1502. In step 1601, the PCSC stack sends a command to the smart card, requesting functionality 'X' from smart card. In step 1602 the smart card responds with a request for verification of the trustworthiness of the computing entity, which is received by the PCSC stack. In step 1603, the PCSC stack receives the request; through PCIA functionality the message will be sent to the trusted component. Either by using the separate PCIA stack or through existing PCIA functionality the message is sent to the trusted component to initiate the integrity

checks. This may be sent directly from the application interface 1503 to the trusted component 1500. In the first specific implementation the verification application 1504 and the subsystem 1502 is used by the trusted component to perform the integrity metrics checks. In a best mode implementation, the trusted component 1500

5 contains functionality within itself to perform these integrity checks on the computer platform directly. In step 1506, the trusted component (in conjunction with the verification application in the first implementation all by itself in the best mode) sends the result of the integrity verification with a digital signature and certificate data to the smartcard. In step 1607 the smartcard receives the result of the integrity verification

10 with the digital signature, verifies the digital signature to authenticate the trusted component, and if satisfied, it trusts the result of the verification of integrity. Based on this result it then decides whether or not to provide the application with functionality "X". The application can then proceed. The smartcard has verified the trustworthiness of the computer platform by requesting to perform an integrity

15 challenge on the computing entity's trusted component and only once satisfied about the result of this challenge accepts to provide functionality to the application.

Claims

5 1. A system of computing apparatus comprising:

 a computing platform having a first data processor and a first data storage means;

10 10 a monitoring component having a second data processor and a second data storage means, wherein said monitoring component is configured to perform a plurality of data checks on said computing platform; and

 a token device being physically distinct and separable from said computing platform and said monitoring component,

15 15 wherein in one mode of operation, said token device operates to make an integrity challenge to said monitoring component and said token device will not undertake specific actions of which it is capable unless it receives a satisfactory response to said integrity challenge.

20 20

 2. The system as claimed in claim 1, wherein said token device receives a detailed response to said integrity challenge, and processes said integrity response to interpret said integrity response.

25 25

 3. The system as claimed in claim 1, further comprising a third party server, wherein a response to said integrity challenge is sent to said third party server.

30 30

 4. The system as claimed in claim 3, wherein said monitoring component sends a detailed integrity response to a third party server if requested to do so in said integrity challenge.

 5. The system as claimed in claim 1, wherein said monitoring component reports a detailed integrity response to said token device and said token device sends said integrity response to said third party server if it requires the third party server to help interpret said detailed integrity response.

35 35

6. The system as claimed in claim 1, in which a third party server simplifies said integrity response to a form in which said token device can interpret said integrity response.

5

7. The system as claimed in claim 1, wherein a third party server sends a simplified integrity response to said token device.

8. The system as claimed in claim 1, operating to add a digital signature 10 data to said simplified integrity response, said digital signature authenticating said third party server to said token device.

9. The system as claimed in claim 1, wherein said monitoring component sends a detailed integrity response to said third party server.

15

10. The system as claimed in any one of the above claims, in which said token device is requested to take an action.

11. The system as claimed in any one of the above claims in which said 20 token device requests to take an action.

12. The system as claimed in any one of the above claims in which said token device sends image data to said computer platform if a said satisfactory response to said integrity challenge is received, and said computer platform displays 25 said image data.

13. The system as claimed in claim 1, wherein said monitoring component is capable of establishing an identity of itself.

30 14. The system as claimed in claim 1, further comprising an interface means for interfacing between said monitoring component and said token device.

15. The system as claimed in claim 1, wherein said computing entity is 35 configured such that said monitoring component reports said data checks to said token device, said data checks containing data describing a status of said computer platform.

16. The system as claimed in claim 1, wherein a said specific action comprises authorising said computing platform to undertake a transaction on behalf of a user of said system.

5

17. A system of computing apparatus comprising:

a computing platform having a first data processor and a first data storage means;

10

a monitoring component having a second data processor and a second data storage means, wherein said monitoring component is configured to perform a plurality of data checks on said computing platform; and

15

a token device being physically distinct and separable from said computing platform and said monitoring component,

wherein said token device sends an integrity challenge to said monitoring component;

20

said monitoring component generates a response to said integrity challenge;

25

if said token device receives a satisfactory response to said integrity challenge, then said token device sends verification data to said computer platform, said verification data verifying correct operation of said computer platform; and

said computer platform displays said verification data on a visual display screen.

30

18. A computing entity comprising:

a computing platform having a first data processor and first data storage means;

35

a monitoring component having a second data processor and second data storage means, wherein said monitoring component is configured to perform a

plurality of data checks on said computing platform, said monitoring component being capable of establishing an identity of itself.

5 interface means for communicating with a token device, said interface means communicating with said monitoring component,

 wherein said computing entity is configured such that said monitoring component reports said data checks to said token device, said data checks containing data describing a status of said computer platform.

10

19. The computing entity as claimed in claim 18, wherein on communication between said token device and said interface means, said monitoring component is activated to perform a monitoring operation on said computer platform, in which said monitoring component obtains data describing an operating status of said computer platform.

20. The computing entity as claimed in claim 18, wherein said interface means is resident substantially wholly within said monitoring component.

20

21. The computing entity as claimed in claim 18, wherein said interface means comprises said computer platform.

25

22. The computing entity as claimed in claim 18, wherein said interface means comprises a PCSC stack in accordance with PCSC Workgroup PC/SC Specification 1.0.

30

23. The computing entity as claimed in claim 18, wherein said monitoring component comprises a verification means configured to obtain a certification data independently certifying said status data, and to provide said certification data to said interface means.

24. The computing entity as claimed in claim 18, wherein said interface means is configured to send and receive data according to a pro-active protocol.

35

25. A method of obtaining verification of a state of a computer entity, said computer entity comprising a computer platform comprising a first data processor

and a first memory means, and a monitoring component comprising a second data processor and a second memory means, said method comprising the steps of:

5 receiving an interrogation request signal via an interface of said computing entity;

said monitoring component performing a monitoring operation of said computer platform in response to a said received interrogation request signal; and

10 said monitoring component reporting a result message to said interface, said result message describing a result of said monitoring operation.

26. A method as claimed in claim 25, in which said monitoring operation comprises the steps of:

15 said monitoring component carrying out one or a plurality of data checks on components of said computing platform; and

20 said monitoring component being able to report a set of certified reference data together with said data checks.

27. The method as claimed in claim 25, wherein said certified reference data includes a set of metrics to be expected when measuring particular components of said computing platform, and includes digital signature data identifying an entity 25 that certifies said reference data.

28. The method as claimed in claim 25, wherein said step of reporting verification of said monitoring operation comprises sending a confirmation signal to a token device said confirmation signal describing a result of said monitoring operation.

30 29. The method as claimed in claim 25, wherein said result message is transmitted by said interface to a token device external of said computing entity.

35 30. The method as claimed in claim 25, comprising the step of reporting a result of said monitoring operation by generating a visual display of confirmation data.

31. The method as claimed in claim 25, further comprising the step of adding a digital signature data to said result message, said digital signature data identifying said monitoring component; and

5

transmitting said result message and said digital signature data from said interface.

32. A method of obtaining verification of a state of a computer entity, said 10 computer entity comprising a computer platform and a monitoring component, said method comprising the steps of:

an application requesting access to a functionality from a token device;

15 in response to said request for access to functionality said token device generating a request signal requesting a verification data from said monitoring component;

20 in response to said request for verification, said monitoring component reporting a result message to said token device, said result message describing a result of a monitoring operation;

25 by receipt of a satisfactory said result message, said token device offers said functionality to said application.

25

33. The method as claimed in claim 32, wherein said monitoring component sends a detailed integrity response to a third party server if requested in an integrity challenge by said token device.

30

34. The method as claimed in claim 32, wherein said monitoring component reports a detailed integrity response to said token device, and said token device sends said integrity response to a third party server if it requires the third party server to help interpret said detailed integrity response.

35. The method as claimed in claim 32, wherein a third party server simplifies said integrity response to a form in which said token device can interpret said integrity response.

5 36. The method as claimed in claim 32, wherein a third party server sends a simplified integrity response to said token device.

37. The method as claimed in claim 32, further comprising the steps of:

10 adding a digital signature data to a simplified integrity response, said digital signature data authenticating a third party server to said token device.

38. A method of checking an integrity of operation of a computing entity, said computing entity comprising a computer platform having a first processor means 15 and first data storage means, and a monitoring component comprising a second processor and second memory means, by means of a token device, said token device comprising a third data processor and a third memory means, said method comprising the steps of:

20 programming said token device to respond to a received poll signal from an application program, said poll signal received from said computer platform;

said token device receiving a poll signal from said computer platform;

25 in response to said received poll signal, said token device generating a signal for requesting a verification operation by said monitoring component; and

said monitoring component performing a verification operation of said computer platform in response to said received signal from said token device.

30

39. A token device for verifying a status of a computing entity, said token device comprising:

a data storage device; and

35

means for communicating with a computing entity;

wherein said data storage device is configured to store a status request message for requesting a status data from said computing entity.

5 40. The token device as claimed in claim 39, further comprising a data processor.

10 41. The token device as claimed in claim 39, said device being configured to be responsive to a poll signal operating in accordance with PC/SC specification 1.0, said token device being capable of initiating a command to be handled by a software stack on the computer entity, in response to said poll signal according to said poll signal according to a proactive protocol.

15 42. A method of verifying a status of a computing entity, by means of a token device provided external of said computing entity, said method comprising the steps of:

 said token device receiving a poll signal;

20 said token device responding to said poll signal by providing a request for obtaining verification of a state of said computer entity; and

 said token device receiving a result message, said result message describing the result of said verification.

25 43. A method by which a token device can obtain verification of a state of a computing platform by using a monitoring component,

30 said monitoring component being capable of performing at least one data check on said computer platform, and establishing an identity of itself, and establishing a report of said at least one data check; and

 wherein said token device has data processing capability and behaves in an expected manner;

said token device being physically separable from said computing platform and said monitoring component, said token device having cryptographic data processing capability

5 wherein, said monitoring component proves its identity to said token device and establishes a report to said token device of at least one data check performed on said computing platform.

44. A token device comprising a data processor and a memory device,
10 said token device configured to perform at least one data processing or signaling function:

wherein said token device operates to:

15 receive an integrity check data from an external source;

if said integrity check data supplied to said token device is satisfactory, then said token device allows a said function; and

20 if said integrity check data received by said token device is unsatisfactory, then said token device denies said function.




FIGURE 1







FIGURE 2










FIGURE 6




FIGURE 7




Fig. 8




Fig. 9




Fig. 10




Fig. 11




Fig. 12





Fig. 13



INTERNATIONAL SEARCH REPORT

Int'l. Application No

PCT/GB 00/00752

A. CLASSIFICATION OF SUBJECT MATTER
IPC 7 G06F1/00

According to International Patent Classification (IPC) or to both national classification and IPC

B. FIELDS SEARCHED

Minimum documentation searched (classification system followed by classification symbols)

IPC 7 G06F

Documentation searched other than minimum documentation to the extent that such documents are included in the fields searched

Electronic data base consulted during the international search (name of data base and, where practical, search terms used)

EPO-Internal, WPI Data, PAJ

C. DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE RELEVANT

Category	Citation of document, with indication, where appropriate, of the relevant passages	Relevant to claim No.
A	<p>FERREIRA R: "THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF STATE OF THE ART SECURITY IN REAL ENVIRONMENTS" PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CRYPTOLOGY - AUSCRYPT, DE, BERLIN, SPRINGER, vol. CONF. 1, 1990, pages 334-355, XP000145211 ISBN: 3-540-53000-2 the whole document</p>	1-44
A	<p>GB 2 317 983 A (SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO LTD) 8 April 1998 (1998-04-08) the whole document</p> <p>—</p> <p>—/—</p>	1-44

Further documents are listed in the continuation of box C.

Patent family members are listed in annex.

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Name and mailing address of the ISA
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NL - 2280 HV Rijswijk
Tel. (+31-70) 340-2040, Tx. 31 651 epo nl,
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INTERNATIONAL SEARCH REPORT

Int'l	Final Application No
PCT/GB 00/00752	

C.(Continuation) DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE RELEVANT

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A	<p>VERSCHUREN T: "Smart access: strong authentication on the Web" COMPUTER NETWORKS AND ISDN SYSTEMS, NL, NORTH HOLLAND PUBLISHING, AMSTERDAM, vol. 30, no. 16-18, 30 September 1998 (1998-09-30), pages 1511-1519, XP004138682 ISSN: 0169-7552 the whole document</p> <hr/> <p>WO 95 24696 A (INTEGRATED TECH AMERICA ;MOONEY DAVID M (US); WOOD DAVID E (US); K) 14 September 1995 (1995-09-14)</p> <hr/>	1-44
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INTERNATIONAL SEARCH REPORT

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Int. Jonal Application No

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